

But tha's thi feyther's nose, aw see,
Well, aw'm blow'd!

Hush! hush! tha munno cry this way,
But get this sope o' cinder tay
While it's warm;
Mi mother used to give it me,
When aw wur sich a lad as thee,
In her arm.

Hush a babby, hush a bee—
Oh, what a temper! dear a-me
Heaw tha skroikes;
Hear's a bit o' sugar, sithee;
Howd thi noise, an' then aw'll gie the
Owt tha loikes.

We'n nobbut gotten coarsish fare,
But eawt o' this tha'st ha' thi share,
Never fear.

Aw hope tha'll never want a meel,
But allus fill thi bally weel
While tha'r't here.

Thi feyther's noan bin wed so long,
An' yet tha sees he's middlin' throg
Wi' go o'.

Besides thi little brother, Ted,
We'n one up-steers, asleep i' bed
Wi' eawr Joe.

But though we'n childer two or three,
We'll mak' a bit o' reawm for thee—
Bless thee, lad!

Tha'r't th' prattiest brid we han i' th' nest;
Come, hutch up closer to mi breast—
Aw'm thi dad."

In the same strain of simple love and cheerful gratitude is his "Ode to th' Sun," of which we give the two last verses:—

"After o' tha comes to own us,
Tho' we do so mich 'at's wrong;
Even neaw thar't shinin' breetly,
Helpin' me to write this song.
Heaw refreshin'! heaw revivin'!
Stay as long as ever t' con!
We shall noan feel hawve as happy,
Hawve as leetsome, when tha'r't gone.

Oh! for th' sake o' foalk at's poorly,
Come an' cheer us wi' thi rays;
We forgotten 'at we all owt
When we see thy dear owd face.
Every mornin' when it's gloomy,
Lots o' foalk are seen abeawt—
Some at th' door-steps—some at th' windows—
Watchin' for thee peepin' eawt."

Nor is Mr. Laycock behind in humour, as witness his account of the mischievous old Bellman's description of a lost baby, of which the following—to imitate our editors—is a sample verse:—

"Law-st, oather to-day or else sometime to morn,
As pratty a babby as ever wur born;
It has cheeks like red roses, two bonny blue een,
Had it meawth daubed wi' traycle th' last toime it wur seen;
It's just cuttin' it teeth, an' has very sore gums,
An' it's gotten a habit o' suckin' it thumbs;
Thoose 'at foind it may keep it, there's nob'dy ull care,
For thoose 'at han lost it han lots moor to spare!"

To him, too, we are indebted for a cordial song of thanks for all that the rich did in the time of the Lancashire Distress; but much as we should like it, we cannot afford Mr. Laycock any more of our space. There are, however, several spirited verses by writers of similar power. Mr. Bealey's "My piece is o bu' woven eawt," Mr. Brierley's "Co l bless these poor wimmen that 's childer!" "Moi Owd Mon," by the author of Scarsdale, Waugh's "Eawr Folk," and many others, well deserve their popularity, and merit the attention of those who have neglected to push their studies of poetry into the region sacred to the Lancashire dialect. In picturesque effects and humorous delineations, produced by a few bold strokes drawn by these rough poet-hands, many lively descriptions of their homely neighbours abound. We may instance again Waugh's account of "Eawr Folk," and Laycock's amusing catalogue of the humble tenants of "Bowton Yard." Both collector and editor have worked hard and conscientiously, but as usual in such undertakings, they have erred in judgment in the direction of over-much carefulness and generosity. We should have coveted a volume one-quarter the size, had we been allowed to do the cutting-down ourselves; as it is, we should as soon think of carrying all our luggage to a picnic because we were confident of being glad of a clean pocket-handkerchief, as of purchasing this cumbersome volume for the sake of the few gems scattered here and there amongst its pages.

MR. SIDGWICK'S METHODS OF ETHICS.*

[SECOND NOTICE.]

An attempt to compress into limits like ours any statement of what we hold to be the answer to the great problem which has

* *The Methods of Ethics.* By Henry Sidgwick, M.A. London: Macmillan and Co.

exercised thought since its dawn, must confine in the narrowest space the critical notice which forms its needed background. The double inconsistency of the view advocated in the examination before us can only be briefly touched on. Utilitarianism, we have said, is futile as an explanation of Ethics; first, because it professes to analyse the idea of duty into a regard for the general interest, and then requires the idea of duty to oblige individuals to attend to the general interest; secondly, because it professes to analyse the idea of morality into a means of happiness, while happiness is itself a complex thing, made up in a large measure of the sense of rightness which was to be resolved into it. And thus the thing which Utilitarianism professes to analyse is returned upon our hands in a twofold form as a result of the supposed analysis.

Thinkers of this school, and our author among them, do not always remember that this analysis is the true test between them and their adversaries. Of course the general aim is general welfare,—they are two words for the same thing. But if you are going to make general welfare explain why Morality is an aim, you must exclude all moral element from the conception of welfare. Happiness must be a completely unmoral condition if its being an aim is to form an explanation of Morals. Mr. Sidgwick's conclusion on this point is not quite clear to us. On the one hand, he concedes (only in a note, however, see p. 93) that the Aristotelian system is misunderstood for want of a better word to translate *eudaimonia* than "happiness;" on the other, he proposes, apparently as a simplification of the whole problem, the conception of a being out of all moral conditions. "When we imagine a conscious being alone in the universe," he says (p. 378), "it seems clear that only its own happiness could be to it an ultimate good." Possibly, but in this statement of the case the problem is entirely got rid of. So far as each of us is cut off from communion with any other mind, his condition ceases to throw light on any moral question. You cannot, by multiplying a millionfold the aims of a being who stands out of relation to every other, represent the aims of a community.

We have said that almost all our objections to Mr. Sidgwick are little more than an expansion of some remark uttered by him as concession or criticism, but we must make an exception of the above. We miss throughout the volume the sense that Ethics deals with man as a corporate being. This mutilated view of Ethics, as we consider it, is the more surprising, because the author has a clear apprehension of the view most remote from it,—that which was taken of all moral questions by the thinkers of the old world. Man, in their view, was primarily the member of a State. The most celebrated discussion on politics in the world starts from the very question which the science of Ethics aims at answering—What is Rightness? It was felt by those whose ideal it expresses that you cannot consider the question at all while you take the individual as a unit. This view may be very easily confused with one examined, and we think rightly dismissed, by Mr. Sidgwick as beyond the scope of Ethics (p. 17), the investigation "not of what ought to be done here and now, but what ought to be the rules of behaviour in an ideal society." This notion involves an error, as he well shows, which is the source not only of intellectual, but of moral confusion, —and we would add, not a purely theoretical source of the latter. It is not merely thinkers, but very ordinary men and women who are familiar with the thought that in such circumstances as theirs rightness is impossible, that they must get into a new set of relations before they can begin to live a good life, and that in the meantime the very notion of duty is inapplicable. Whether they yield to these whisperings or not, there comes a time when they discern that thus to acquiesce is to sap all moral strength, that however tangled with disaster the relations in which a man is involved, there is yet at every moment some possible attitude for him which is a right one. But it is one thing to say that Ethics is an investigation of the rules of behaviour in an ideal State, and another to say that it is the investigation of man's duty as the member of a State. Take the simpler case of a family; a son has treated a father with perfidy and ingratitude, he has utterly forgotten that he is a son. Does it nevertheless remain that the father retains a father's duties? Is the relation between them one of contract, "so much filial respect on your side, so much parental care on mine?" so that a failure of the conditions on which parental care is given, ends the claim for it? Or is it rather a condition of that higher unity of which father and son are but members, and which nothing can end but their ceasing to exist?

We gather from these pages that their author would choose the first of these alternatives, and it cannot be denied that it is towards this that modern thought has mainly directed itself. One who holds that the truth here lies rather with the thinkers of the old

world can do little more in such a space as this than endeavour to make the issue between the two parties clear. And as our last article was an attempt to point out the weakness of that view which explains duty by its influence on general happiness, and tends to base duty on contract, the present is an attempt to point out the strength of its opposite,—that which regards duty as the secret of a completer organic union to beings who have imperfectly attained it.

We have objected to Mr. Sidgwick's definition of Ethics as the science of conduct, and if we had to propose an alternative, we should define it almost indifferently as the science of Aims, or the science of Relations. For all moral aims are relations, and the very meaning of the word "ought" is that these take precedence of every other, not *ought* to take precedence—of course we must not use the word defined in our definition of it—but actually do so. The father whom we imagined incensed at treacherous ingratitude in a son may be strongly tempted towards a severance of all bonds with one so base, may feel this desire so strongly that the act of yielding to it would supply vivid satisfaction, yet if he at the same moment discerns that oneness of the family which remains as outraged truth when it is defied as actual fact, he has a larger aim before him, one which he does prefer, even though he does not act in conformity with his preference. It is not that, as Mr. Mill says, he knows both pleasures, that of gratified resentment and that of forgiveness, and prefers the latter, we question if those who prefer the last do know the first. It is not that he wants a particular feeling in his own mind which can only be reached through forgiveness; no one ever got the better of one feeling by means of the wish for another. It is that he sees a reality independent of all feelings from which he dreads separation, and that in conformity to that membership forgiveness consists. In taking this view of the claim of duty we are at issue with Mr. Sidgwick in our conception of duty, which he considers to lie in actions, and which our view must exhibit as rather a certain attitude of spirit (see Book III., chap. xii, and especially p. 351); for it is quite conceivable here that the father who forgave and the father who repudiated his son might take the same line of conduct; we should think any one who said in such a case "You must not see me again," showed probably a great want of judgment, but we should concede that in certain conceivable cases even this was compatible with a recollection of the bond between the two, and a desire to give all that self-sacrificing attention to the welfare of another which is the ideal of parental love. We are not guarded, even by the most conscientious desire to do right, from the most disastrous blunders, and these have always some connection with defect in the moral nature; but the perception of these, with all the shame and pain it involves, is entirely distinct from remorse. Conscience is not the faculty that points out the relative value of the various groups of which man is a member, so that you may say in what relation paternal duty, for instance, stands to citizenship, or what proportion of the claim of kindred is acquired by long friendship, or work with a common aim, or great benefits. Conscience is simply that in every man which converts or tries to convert judgment to will. It is that influence "impossible à méconnaître, facile à étouffer" (as Madame de Stael expresses it), which draws us towards what judgment decides on as the dominant relation in our lives.

In making this decision, each of us, no doubt, has a great deal more light for himself than he has for any one else; but as a *matter of judgment*, it is exactly of the same kind. We must all feel, in judging of duty for another, as if we were reading an obscure document by twilight; just when the meaning seems clear, some word is reached which is impossible to reconcile with it. And surely no one who knows life will say that there is nothing of this perplexity in deciphering our own duties. The steadfast purpose to do right does, indeed, arrange in marvellous simplicity the problem which vanity or passion has complicated, but still the problem is there, conscience undertakes to supply no answer to it. All its urgency is directed to this,—that each one of us should decide for himself exactly as he would decide for another. He may decide wrong for himself, as he may decide wrong for another; all that conscience insists is that the judge who appraises the value of varied springs of action shall take no account of any that belong to the exclusive self. To discard these is very often to give the answer, but not always.

If this negative assertion is all we can say of the form of the Moral Judgment, that in all cases the choice for each one must be the choice for all *in like circumstances*, can we say nothing more of its substance? In discerning the corporate nature of Humanity, we believe this question re-

ceives its implicit answer. We do not mean that the moment you substitute the conception of membership of a body for that of a duty in the abstract you have got rid of all perplexity; apparently you have not got rid of any, but have merely restated your question in another language. For the same man is a member of various groups, and stands in a different degree of closeness to each. We are bound to our kindred by strong ties, but these are not the only ties that bind us; we sometimes feel others drawing us in a different direction, and any one must be very inexperienced and very ignorant who does not know that these various bonds are the sources of real perplexity. How is it to be solved?

Only by a clear recognition of the principle that the gradation of organic union is the gradation of claim, with its negative side—that every impulse which leads to mere severance is an antagonist to duty, that in the acts of purest aversion, if we take the word in its literal sense, the right attitude will always be one of membership. Here we shall seem to many to be uttering one of those tautologies whose dominion in moral science Mr. Sidgwick points out as so perilous to exact thought, for how, it may be asked, could you define organic union but as that which rightly claims our allegiance? If you do not assert that kindred in all cases makes the first claim on a man's activity, you can only test this oneness of adhesion by rightful claim, so that the argument is in a circle. Our answer is that we are not giving a definition, but a test. We are describing the practical issue as it appeals to the Will at every crisis of action, and is tested by the certain ripening of time. As the disintegrating influences are altogether evil, so the binding influences are good in the proportion in which they tend to build up a certain organic whole. The significance of this seeming truism is shown by the multitude of impulses which arrange themselves against it, and these not all of an apparently evil nature. Fanaticism and taste, no less than hatred, outrage this allegiance to a hierarchy of union, and blur the gentle gradation of varied spiritual kinship with sudden contrasts and dazzling lights and shadows. But if any moral verdict is possible at all; if looking back on our own lives, or the lives of others, we can in any case say there ill was done and there good was done, we shall find that the right action was the action of a son, or a brother, or a citizen; the wrong action was that of an isolated being, to whom its separate existence was an aim.

We have said, somewhat coarsely, perhaps, that what we conceive the true ideal of morality was the ideal of the old world rather than of the new, and we may justly be asked to reconcile so glaring a paradox with the most elementary notions of right and wrong. In truth, it must be allowed that the qualification we should introduce into that statement modifies its whole meaning. The best men of the old world failed to recognise some elements of goodness that are apparent to the least excellent of our contemporaries. Mr. Sidgwick reminds us, in a passage fully exhibiting his power of delicate criticism, that the most celebrated of all delineations of an ideal state contains a pregnant warning against the blindness of such ideal delineations in its acceptance of war (we would add slavery) as a permanent condition of human society, an acceptance from which the soberest modern Utopia would shrink. The antique ideal of life is that of a small island of orderly and harmonious union surrounded by an ocean of disorder. It is a union which owes all its strength to exclusiveness. Within this inner circle union is cemented not only by attraction to a centre, but by that great additional force of repulsion at the circumference. That impulse of severance which we have excluded from our principles of action was with them the motive-power of half the world of action; they could not have conceived union without it. We have to use their gold without the alloy to which it owed half its strength. We, if mere "fragments," as Shakespeare makes Coriolanus, with a fine utterance of Roman scorn, call the mob, are fragments of a larger whole. Whereas the largest ideal of antique communion stopped far short of humanity, ours must take account of impulses that are not even peculiar to humanity. No theory of human action, we venture to assert, can stand henceforward which is not applicable to all gradation of sentient life in its gradual approach to Humanity. That the impulses which are to bind us must be such as find their germ in the tribes below us is, we believe, the most important canon which Science has, in our day, furnished to philosophy.

We believe, therefore, that if, on the one hand, the theory of modern life has receded from this ideal of corporate union, which is the true meaning of Morality, on the other, the latest development of science is bringing us back to that ideal. We are certain, at all events, that this is the only view that makes history at all comprehensible. Suppose that the only thing that men desire is pleasure, in any sense which does not make pleasure identical

with whatever men do desire, and so rob that assertion of all significance, and you are obliged to explain every great event in history by the hypothesis of enormous stupidity in all but a few leaders. There have been wars for the sake of plunder, no doubt, but would this motive account for the great wars of the world? The unity of a nation or a creed has been the object for which ordinary men have thought it worth while to give up all that makes life pleasant, to confront all that makes it painful. We do not see what could demonstrate that to be one with our kind is an ultimate craving, if this does not demonstrate it. If we cannot learn what men want by observing their efforts to get what they want, there is no means of settling the question at all.

Do we, then, it may be asked, propose this ideal of oneness with our kind as something more ultimate than the distinction of right and wrong, so as to make this notion itself derivative, and explain rightness as a means towards union, in the same way that Utilitarians explain it as a means towards pleasure? In that case we must, of course, accept the same conditions we have shown to be binding on Utilitarians; as happiness must be an unmoral condition if it is to explain morality, so must union. There can be, then, no question of any moral distinction *within* this hierarchy of union. If it is to be a thing more ultimate than morality, the question becomes one of a mere maximum and minimum of binding power, and it would be then impossible to imagine one set of beings morally superior to another, supposing the union between the two groups to be equally close. To state such an inference is to refute the theory which originates it, nor is the experimental refutation of the view which makes all union equally holy, and its distinction only in the closeness or permanence of the bond, and the number of those it would include, far to seek. As for the first and second, we believe that not even the tenderness of a mutual love round which the sanctions of common duty have woven their clinging tendrils, quite equals in the *sensation* of closeness that guilty union which replaces the claim of a loathed bond by the fierce impulse of a self-chosen allegiance; and though this kind of union is generally as short-lived as it is intense, it sometimes affords a specimen of life-long fidelity. As for the last, to inquire whether such and such a course of action would put one in harmony with the greater number of one's fellow-creatures would in certain contingencies be absolutely a negative test of duty; there never was a Reformer, for instance, who would not have been condemned to inaction by it. But if neither the closeness, nor the permanence, nor the extent of union can be regarded as a guarantee for its rightness, how can we do without this very element of rightness which it was the object of this view to explain? We cannot do without it. We hold that the idea of moral evil is more ultimately an object of recoil to the human spirit which discerns it than even the idea of absolute severance from all but self, which is the full fruition of evil. We believe, for instance, that while the instinct of purity is that which guards the oneness of the family, these two things corresponding so exactly that every impure impulse ultimately threatens this oneness, and every increase of purity increases its security, yet it is *as* impurity we shrink from this evil, not even as that which destroys anything supremely excellent; and we take a like view of the relation of falsehood to the oneness of our common intellectual constitution. We fully concede, therefore, the ultimate aspect of moral evil. Our assertion is not that union *per se* is the ultimate object to humanity, but that a hierarchy of union is so. The objection that to make this distinction is to convert an assumed explanation into a mere restatement of the original problem in different language is plausible, but unjust. The truth that the oneness which is the ultimate object of human yearning is an organic oneness, is no mere restatement of the truism that duties involve others than the person to whose conscience they appeal. No doubt you may so state this truth as to use the word "rightness" on both sides of the equation, and thus give the merely logical intellect an excuse for striking it out on both sides. Rightness is union in a certain order, and order is a certain right relation. But the epithet "right" in the definition has a far wider range than the thing "rightness," which it is used to explain. It carries on the mind from the conception of certain feelings within to an objective system of relations without. The word "right," on this view, does, indeed, acquire a new dimension when we apply it to human relation, but a dimension superficially identical with that which it has in its application to all other relation. Purity is right for man in the same sense that the earth is the right place for the roots of a tree, in a sense which, indeed, takes in its human application a depth belonging to no other relation, but which includes that surface of meaning which it covers

in its bearing on the unmoral world. You can, just as much explain why the roots of a tree ought to be hidden in the ground as you can explain why purity is a moral aim, it is a condition of organic development; but it is a simpler statement of the same fact, and one much nearer the experience of all who deal with the things concerned, to say that the tree whose roots are exposed and the nation which ceases to make purity an aim must both perish. And this new dimension given to an old truth which may be misrepresented as a mere tautology, is the key to the whole meaning of what we call Natural Law.

We have in the attempt to supplement this critical examination of ethical thought by a meagre outline of what we hold to be its true basis been unable adequately to express our admiration for the work reviewed itself. If we spoke our whole mind, we should accuse Mr. Sidgwick of sympathy with that disintegrating tendency of modern thought which seems to us the guide-post *away* from the true theory of morals. But the candour, largeness, and accuracy of his intellectual vision make his review a fitting prelude to any conclusion, for almost all the facts on which a moral hypothesis must be based are touched on in it. The arrangement of the whole, which we have seen questioned, seems to us to reveal to patient attention the most careful consideration of the varied relations of his subject-matter, and the style, though wanting perhaps in the variety which would be the ideal of a review of so large a field, is exactly adapted to what it conveys. There is not, in the 473 pages of the volume, one which is languid, obscure, or verbose; there is scarcely one which the reader may not re-peruse, with the satisfaction at once of adding detail to an interesting picture, and of harvesting the seed-corn of thought.

SCHLIEHMANN'S "TROY."

[SECOND NOTICE.]

Of the pottery which forms a prominent feature in Dr. Schliemann's discoveries, four classes are especially important. First, those vases which have a neck bent back like that of a swan and a beak-shaped mouth; secondly, vases in the shape of animals; thirdly, those with owls' faces, two upraised wings at the sides, and the body of a woman; fourthly, those described by Dr. Schliemann as "brilliant red goblets, in the form of immense champagne-glasses, with two mighty handles." Of the last two classes more anon. In most of the vases the handle is a conspicuous feature, and many have holes or rings for suspension, as is the case with some of the vases found in Etruscan tombs. We must not pass over the terra-cotta vase-covers, generally representing the head of the owl. On pages 291 and 352 are represented terra-cottas from the Greek stratum, described as bearing hieroglyphics. These engravings we have shown to a most distinguished Egyptologist, who fails to recognise such characters in them. The same high authority claims as Cyprian one of the very few indisputably human-headed vase-covers (No. 185, p. 268). He points out the projecting eye, a peculiarity said still to characterise the people of Cyprus.

The excavations tend to discredit the theory of a separate "Stone Age," inasmuch as stone implements appear side by side with copper, and with pottery of fine workmanship. Good stone implements were probably often preferred to such inferior tools of metal as an early age could produce. Some have doubted whether effective arms could be made of simple copper, but there is really no doubt of the fact. Sir John Lubbock (*Prehistoric Times*, chap. vii.) states that the ancient inhabitants of North America hammered out copper axes even without the agency of fire. Some, however, of the implements originally classed by Dr. Schliemann as copper seem to contain an admixture of tin.

Among the discoveries in 1872, perhaps the most interesting is that of the "Great Tower of Ilium," surmounted by benches of stones joined with earth. From this point, according to Dr. Schliemann, Priam surveyed the hosts of Greece and Troy. In the following year, Dr. Schliemann came upon a double gateway, finding even the copper bolts of the gates, which he naturally identifies with the "Scæan Gate." Close to this gateway he places the "Palace of Priam." It was by the side of this building that he met with the crowning mercy,—the discovery of "the treasure." Thinking he saw gold behind a copper vessel, he called off his men to breakfast, and while they were out of the way, he cut out "the treasure" from beneath the tottering wall. "The treasure" comprises, besides about 9,000 small objects made of the precious metals, several large vessels of gold and silver; a copper shield, a cauldron, and several weapons of the

* *Troy and its Remains: a Narrative of Researches and Discoveries made on the Site of Ilium and in the Trojan Plain.* By Dr. Henry Schliemann. Translated with the Author's sanction. Edited by Philip Smith, B.A. London: John Murray. 1875.