

## THE READER.

17 JUNE, 1865.

manded, or by being attracted?" In the course of a clear and unencumbered explanation of the difficult passage ii. 15-21, Professor Lightfoot gives the true moral or spiritual sense to "the Law," but on the same page he slips into the more common erroneous way of speaking. He interprets verse 18 thus: "If, after destroying the old ceremonial, I attempt to build it up again, I condemn myself—I testify to my guilt in the work of destruction." The pulling down and building up have reference, doubtless, to the Mosaic Law." Not to the Mosaic Law as a ritual or ceremonial: St. Paul never pulled this down. But to the principle of righteousness by the Law, as opposed to the principle of righteousness by faith.

In discussing the question when this Epistle was written, Professor Lightfoot contends for a later date than the one usually given. The common view is, that when the Apostle had paid his second visit to Galatia, he wrote this Letter soon after settling for three years at Ephesus, and before the two Epistles to the Corinthians. Professor Lightfoot believes that it was written some two or three years later, between the Second Epistle to the Corinthians and the Epistle to the Romans. He supports this view by several arguments, and especially by dwelling upon the strong resemblance between this Epistle and that to the Romans. This argument must be allowed to have real weight. It may be met by some neutralizing considerations, and by a certain probability that the Letter was written soon after the visit, in which the evils assailed in the Letter had already given trouble. The conclusion, we think, must remain doubtful. The other arguments adduced by our author are only some of those feathers which may be blown in any direction by an ingenious critic. It is a common snare of Biblical critics, whether negative or orthodox, to attach too much weight to faint and shadowy presumptions in the absence of more conclusive data. In the desire to support this view, or to refute that, the laws of proof are sometimes quite forgotten. Professor Lightfoot is eminently moderate and cautious, but we find in his notes the following singular example of such forgetfulness. St. Paul speaks (Gal. ii. 11) of an occasion on which he withstood Peter to the face at Antioch. This may have taken place either when St. Paul was at Antioch, after the holding of the Council at Jerusalem (Acts xv. 30), or during a subsequent visit, when he spent some time at Antioch (Acts xviii. 22, 23), just before his second visit to the "country of Galatia." There are some arguments which would lead us to prefer the later time, as that Paul does not seem to have stayed long at Antioch on the former occasion; and that, as Judas and Silas were sent on a special mission from the Apostles at Jerusalem, it was not very likely—Paul and Barnabas being also there—that Peter would have come down to Antioch immediately, or that messengers from James should also arrive, and so forth; while, on the other hand, it is not improbable that some years after Peter might be sojourning at Antioch, and Paul find him there. Professor Lightfoot, however, in his note (page 114), says summarily that the later occasion cannot be meant, "for it does not appear that Barnabas was with him then." The argument would have weight if it ran "it appears that Barnabas was not with him then." But nothing of the kind appears. It is true that in the line mentioning this visit to Antioch—"he went down to Antioch, and, after he had spent some time there, he departed"—no mention is made of Barnabas. But Barnabas was more likely to be at Antioch than anywhere else. And it is certainly more likely that he should have been "carried away," if he had been working for some time under St. Peter, than when he was in the full swing of companionship with St. Paul, and had just seen the whole policy of his leader supported by the unanimous decision of the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem.

Professor Lightfoot, however, is less chargeable with hasty reasoning of this kind than most commentators and critics. A certain

clear good sense never deserts him in his expositions. We have never seen the well-known difficulties in the Epistle to the Galatians better handled than in this work. Most happily, also, the author has given us an admirable example of moderation and courtesy. Whilst he considers Professor Jowett's "general theory of the looseness of St. Paul's language an entire mistake," he speaks of the Oxford Professor's work in terms of high appreciation. His own leaning is towards a candid and liberal orthodoxy in all disputed questions. On the whole, we must congratulate the University of Cambridge on being so creditably represented as it is by this primary contribution of its Hulsean Professor to the literature of the New Testament.

### SEA-BATHING.

*Sea-air and Sea-bathing for Children and Invalids: their Properties, Uses, and Mode of Employment.* By M. Le Docteur Brochard. Translated and Edited by William Strange, M.D. (Longman & Co.)

THE French are often reproached for the superficiality of their knowledge. It is assumed that because they can always express their opinions with precision, and always appear to have opinions to express, therefore they cannot be qualified for stating views which are well-considered or profound. If the reproach be generally applicable, the particular exceptions which must be made are very numerous. When a Frenchman is really master of his subject, he can treat it in a way which does not admit either of comparison or of improvement. Not only can he propound that which is novel; but he can do so in such a style as to attract the attention of the most listless readers. More frequently do we feel inclined to reproach French writers with the profundity than with the shallowness of their works, when the writers are well-versed in the subjects they treat.

Dr. Brochard's little volume is an illustration of this. Though not large, it contains much that might have been omitted. For example, the author goes back to antiquity for illustrations of a practice which he afterwards tells us is essentially a modern one. We have the heading "Sea-bathing as practised by the Ancients," and under it we read that the ancients used baths. He adds, "In fact, sea-bathing, considered as a means of modifying the health, is entirely a modern idea. It was in England and Germany that people first occupied their attention with its effects, about the latter half of the last century. The shores of the North Sea, the Baltic, and the English Channel, were the first to have bathing places erected upon them. France followed slowly in the wake of her sister kingdoms. Some few bathing establishments were, however, erected at Boulogne and Dieppe, not during the eighteenth century, but at the beginning of the present; and then French practitioners first began to occupy themselves with marine medication."

Passing over the mistake of introducing the ancients at all, we find nothing to object to in this treatise. It contains a vast deal of valuable information respecting a subject about which the general public is painfully ignorant. To go to the sea-side is fashionable. The place chosen is regarded as comparatively immaterial, so long as lodgings are to be had at moderate prices, and amusements can be enjoyed at pleasure. Dr. Brochard very sensibly points out that if health be what is sought, the choice of a watering-place is a matter of primary importance. "Both the physiological and curative effects of various bathing stations differ most essentially as regards both the sea-water and the sea-air, according to the situation; and these effects are, in reality, as dissimilar the one from the other, as are the natural appearances of the several bathing-places themselves." "We see that thoughtless people frequent indifferently places so entirely different as Dieppe and

Biarritz (Scarborough and Torquay); as if the baths at these two places, so widely different in every element—climate and the nature of the beach—were possessed of identical properties." Those who merely go to the place for which they have a fancy need not wonder, then, if the result should be disappointing. The chances are that they will return home in a worse state of health, than when they went, for a cure, to the sea-side.

Both Dr. Brochard and the translator insist on the importance of not confounding brackish with sea-water. There are several so-called sea-bathing places, where hardly any salt is to be found in the water or any sand on the beach. To reside in such places and to bathe in such water can do no good to any invalid. Yet thousands frequent places of that character, and fancy they are giving themselves a fair chance to recover lost health and vigour. Moreover, a bathing-place which may be suited for those who frequent it in July and August, may prove detrimental to the health of the invalids who flock thither in September and October. These considerations serve to show the necessity for asking the advice of a competent physician before starting for the sea-coast. In Dr. Brochard we have not only a physician who thoroughly understands his subject, but also a monitor who has at heart the best interests of all invalids. He may perhaps overrate the advantages of La Tremblade, which is the theatre of his practice and the chief source of his experience, but his general remarks are dictated by good-feeling and good sense. Would that the following observations received the attention they merit! They are chiefly directed against the practices at French watering-places; but they apply with almost equal force to what prevails at the fashionable watering-places of our own country. "Of all amusements which are in vogue at the sea-side, dancing is the most dangerous, although, unhappily, the most resorted to." "The fatigue which exercise and bathing have already induced, and the excitement of the functions of the skin which the salt water has occasioned, render children of a tender age quite unable to stand the drain of excessive perspiration which these balls often induce; to say nothing of the ill effects of late hours, and of the respiration of air charged with the emanations from great numbers of persons, and further vitiated by a number of gas-lights." To this, the translator very properly adds, "After having taken all possible care that their little charges should breathe nothing but the health-giving breath of heaven all day, what madness can equal the folly of setting them to inhale, for several hours at night, an atmosphere polluted with deadly poison?"

### HEGEL'S "DEAD SECRET."

*The Secret of Hegel; being the Hegelian System in Origin, Form, and Matter.* By Jas. Hutchinson Stirling. (Longman.)

[Second Notice.]

WE have said, in a former notice, that the whole plan of this book seems to us a mistake—that we do not think the presentation of the most abstract and technical portion of Hegel's philosophy in an English garb likely to prove a successful attempt at introducing that philosophy to English readers. A better method of accomplishing such an object appears to us to illustrate, from those of his writings which are occupied with the facts of humanity, that part of his system which is capable of such illustration. It is a hazardous innovation to criticise by example rather than precept, and a more difficult subject for such a criticism than an exposition of Hegel's philosophy could hardly be proposed. Nevertheless, to the very small extent which this is possible in the pages of a newspaper, this is the scope of the following passages. They are not exclusively or chiefly a paraphrase of anything in the work under our notice, but, as an application of the principles unfolded there, they are not irrelevant in a review of that work.

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If we were to select any one expression as fitted to suggest the whole system of Hegel, it should be one occurring more than once in these volumes, that *Nature is the Other of Spirit*. By this something more is meant than that Nature and Spirit are correlatives, as right and left; convex and concave, up and down. It is true, also, they are relatively this; and the definition of each comes clearest to our mind when it is made in terms of the other. The essence of Matter is Gravity; that is, subordination to something out of itself; the essence of Spirit is Freedom, subordination to nothing out of itself. Thus Spirit and Nature are antithetical—the convex and concave of the curve. But this is not the whole truth, for Spirit is not the other to Nature; Nature is absolutely the other. Nature has no meaning apart from Spirit. We most clearly represent to ourselves the standing-point of Hegel by taking some specimen of extreme materialism, and simply inverting it. "This universe matter with its functions, one of which is mind,"—take the converse of that assertion, and you are at the starting-point to follow Hegel. Thought, therefore, is alone true existence. The laws of Thought are Law absolutely—law apart from the limitations of time and space; and, in investigating the necessary decisions of Reason, we are learning the conditions of that which is. It is not easy, without many words, to exhibit the distinctness of this from the ordinary view. We conceive of the Mind as a mirror set up against Nature, Truth as the undistorted reflection in that mirror; but Hegel's universe has no such duality; with him the mirror makes its own reflection, and Truth is no less than Existence.

The Idea, with him, does not correspond to, but is the fact. Now the truth of the Idea is to be found in the reconciliation of contradictions. The first movement of the mind is simple apprehension, or perception, an affirmative decision; the second is judgment, a negative decision; the third, that of Reason, a harmony of both. Reason sees identity through difference, affirmation through negation, takes the two ends of the line, a mere line hitherto, and joins them in a higher point into the perfect triangle. Sense says Yes, Judgment says No, Reason says Both. When we come to apply this scheme to the facts of history, Hegel sometimes seems to use words in a very peculiar sense, but it is in this process that we best understand his meaning. We take an instance from his philosophy of History.

The aim of history is the realizing of the idea of Spirit, which is Freedom. Of this we have three phases in the history of the world. The Oriental stage (Persia) presents us with the mere barren affirmative of Control, the supremacy of One. The Orientals only knew that One is free. In arriving at the Classical period, we come to discernment, difference, limitation. The Greeks and Romans knew that *some* are free—that is, that some are *not* free. Only the Teutonic race realizes the truth that all are free, in perceiving that only under Law is Freedom possible, in perceiving that Obedience and Liberty—the inevitable alternatives of the Understanding—are to the Reason reconciled, identified in Will. This rhythmical movement of Thought finds its purest and highest example in Love. Love is at once the production and the resolution of the greatest of contradictions—that I give up myself, lose my own individuality to find it in another. The completeness which is the essence of my individuality is thus denied; I surrender myself, yield up my personality, I who cannot cease to be a Person. Love obliterates Right, it knows nothing of Contract. The view of marriage which regards it as contract ignores this essential element of its being. The essence of Contract is Right, the essence of Love is the surrender of Right. The hard and cruel theory of Roman law (this illustration is not Hegel's), that the son has no rights against his father, the wife against her husband, is the petrification of the *ideal* of the Family, which knows members only, not persons. As a citizen, I am a Person; as

member of a family, I am a father or a son. In this capacity I belong not to the State—the realm of right—but to the Family—the realm of love. But this is only to be a stage of preparation; here again we find ourselves at a starting-point for this rhythmical movement, this *tri-une* idea. The Family is to be dissolved, the man is to become a citizen rather than a son. Hence parents love their children more than children their parents, for the tendency of life leads the son from the father, the father to the son. The family lies behind the son, he must quit it, if it has fulfilled its aim. He leaves the Family—the sphere of Simple Apprehension—to enter on the second phase of this development, which, according to the scheme, must belong to the region of the Understanding—in this process it is the sphere of Civic Union. This is not yet the State, the State is the apex of the triangle, we are only at one of its angles. Civic Union does not historically precede the State, for it can only arise in a Nation. We may, perhaps, describe it as the union of Contract, a state which is not also a nation. It is union which is a mere means to an end, as opposed to that true national union which is, as even in our day we have seen abundantly exemplified, capable of inspiring a desire far transcending any aspiration that could be kindled by the many excellent uses and products of national life. Civic union knows nothing of this feeling, it is the mere city bond, a mere association of individuals. Here, then, the man has passed into the region of negation. As a son, he was part of a whole; as a citizen, he breaks and denies this bond. He stands on his own individuality; he is in the realm of difference. But this progress is only true in its ultimate goal—the State, or Nation. Only the Nation satisfies Reason. The Nation, unlike Plato's ideal State, recognizes the family as its basis and type. It turns back from that negation of the mere citizen to the first ideal of the Family. The Family is, indeed, dissolved, but the spirit of the family remains. The State is spirit realizing itself. In the State we again quit the region of contract. I have no more choice in being an Englishman, than I have in being a son. Only in the spirit of a son can I belong to a nation. Here, then, as invariably in this process—this harmony of thought—we find that we end nearer our first than our second standpoint. When we have learned to harmonize the Yes and No, it is the Yes that we emphasize. Yet the first Yes is, apart from this process, untrue. We cannot abide in the Family; we abide in the State. The Family, as upheld against the State, would be untrue. The father cannot demand illegal acts, even if they be not immoral. Love is the first element of life; but the unconscious love of the child must be merged in the obedience of the citizen before it rises into the devotion of the patriot. It appears to us—but this thought is also not Hegel's—that we best conceive of this triplicity of development in applying it to the stages of an individual life. Childhood is dogmatic: the child says, "I know." Youth is critical: the young man says, "I doubt." Age typical, if not average age, is reasonable: the old man says, "I believe"—that is, "I doubt," reflected back into "I know." Here, again, "I believe" is nearer "I know" than "I doubt;" but it contains the doubt. Here, Hegel has a deep lesson to teach us. How would all education, all criticism, be deepened and purified, if we could look upon the narrowness and captiousness of immaturity as a note in the chord of truth! This spirit of negation, this activity of the mere understanding which is the reaction from the submissiveness of the "ages of faith"—the childhood of the individual or the race—and forms such an ungraceful phase in the development of both, giving us an eighteenth century, and irreverent young people;—this is not a spirit to be repressed, it is a constituent element in the perfect man. We cannot truly say, "I believe" till we have truly said, "I doubt;" and the spirit that rests in mere affirmation remains in an intellectual childhood which,

however beautiful, forms no model for the race.

If we should inquire after the value and not the purport of Hegel's writings, we should enter on a task as superior in difficulty to that we have endeavoured to fulfil, as it is inferior in importance. We believe that by Mr. Stirling this value is over-estimated; but the most startling sentences in his volumes might be paralleled with quotations excelling them in apparent extravagance from writers who are as unlike as possible to himself. On this opinion, then, we may merely remark, when Mr. Stirling claims for his master "a place higher than the very highest of his predecessors," that, in the first place, a man who has spent his life in the study of a system is more likely to understand, though not, perhaps, to appreciate it relatively to others, than one who has not done so; and, in the second place, that without some relative exaggeration, it would be difficult to spend laborious days in the unravelling of obscure and technical language, and that so far, therefore, this exaggeration is a mere matter of course. But when a certain process of thought is claimed as the scheme of the universe, when Mr. Stirling tells us, as perhaps Hegel would not have told us, that when the system is completed we shall know "the thoughts of God before the birth of time," then our philosopher has quitted the region on which alone we think it worth while to follow him. If we contemplate the system in itself, apart from these magnificent claims, the dangers of it are very obvious. The tendency to find in error undeveloped truth is easily distorted into the tendency that identifies error with undeveloped truth—the view in which evil is a means of good, into the view in which evil is only a lower form of good. We may take an instance from the work which supplies most of our illustrations, Hegel's "Philosophy of Right." No book that we ever read gives evidence more unmistakable of a pure and lofty love of liberty. Mr. Mill's book on the subject is all there, and very much besides. But yet a defence of slavery might be extracted from its pages without any great unfairness. The fact that slavery was an historical necessity is so stated as easily to lend itself to the theory that slavery may be a justifiable condition, involving those who perpetuate it in no moral blame. The habit of looking at all facts as symbols, gives a certain coldness and vagueness to Hegel's feeling about history, and might, in the mind of a disciple, easily assume the form of that perilous heresy, that there can be no such thing as national crime. Nor do we see how any one can assert that Good is the possibility of, and conquest over, Evil, and yet deny that Evil shares the eternity of Good.

These are the dangers of systems, not of methods; they are developed in the minds of disciples, not of teachers. In the teacher here we believe ourselves to possess one of those rich minds whose germs of thought, liberated from their prickly husk, are destined to ripen in the most various and distant soils—a thinker whose influence will be felt in after years by many who could not understand a line of his writings, and may never have heard his name.

## LIBRARIES AND THEIR FOUNDERS.

*Libraries and Founders of Libraries* By Edward Edwards. (Trübner & Co.)

THE least satisfactory chapters in this volume are those treating of "Monastic Libraries Abroad and at Home." This is the more to be regretted, because to the student of literary history there is no field of inquiry more interesting than that which opens to his view the sources of knowledge which were available to those great master-minds which shed the light of genius and learning over the Dark Ages. What Roger Bacon studied, what Dante or Chaucer read, how much of the wisdom of the ancients is to be found in the Christian ethics of the great Fathers of the Church, are only to be traced by means of the lists of MSS. which then