

literature—of whom there are eminent examples amongst the Pragmatists—to devote themselves to discovering and preparing such a way of peace? Or perhaps, in order to reach the great world, it is necessary first to inspire those who, in quick and comprehensive sympathy, stand nearest to it. Philosophy must indeed, as Dr. Schiller says, “aim at man’s complete satisfaction;” but philosophy itself can never satisfy any but the philosopher; that is, human nature as modified by philosophizing; it is impossible that the same thing in the same form should satisfy those who have not philosophized. To spread philosophical ideas amongst mankind, is the task of literature, eloquence and poetry.

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THE MORAL IDEAL. A Historic Study. By Julia Wedgwood. New and revised edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1907. Pp. vii, 504.

This is an able and a delightful book. It is difficult to give a good summary of it in a short space, because its range is so wide and its peculiar merit lies not so much in any startling novelty of view, as in the many fresh and stimulating *aperçus* with which it is filled. Moreover the work, though anything but incoherent, is not, and does not pretend to be, closely systematic; it is a series of separate studies on important types of moral aspiration, found in civilizations so diverse as those of Egypt, India, Persia, Greece and Rome. Unity is given by the writer’s strong personality and her unflinching grasp on those principles she considers of permanent value. Among these stands chief the spirit of what she well defines as “Spiritual Democracy—the sense of an indefeasible claim on human sympathy in every human being” (p. 459). “This,” she says, “is in any vital sense a thing of yesterday,” and it has been vitalized, she holds, in great part by the growth of the nation as distinct from the city. In this way: The nation’s own limits are so wide as to force its patriots into a more comprehensive view; it *collects* and does not *select* its citizens; “the love of the nation is the love of the neighbor” (p. 89), that is, I take it, the love of those to whom we are bound more by the ties of common humanity than by any special choice or individual preference. There is a great deal in this, and it gives a freshness to the distinction between modern states and the states of

classical antiquity (though of course Miss Wedgwood will not deny that there *is* an element, and a large one, of special preference in the love of the nation).

It is impressive in this connection that she opens her book with a recognition of Egypt as the first united kingdom: as in this respect the most modern as well as the most ancient of nations, (p. 11). And in another respect Egypt is held to be modern: in its concern with death, and its hope of immortality. Miss Wedgwood is aware that this dictum will seem paradoxical to some; to the present reviewer it appears indubitable; the exquisite quotations given from Egyptian literature speak directly to us, whatever our beliefs, for none of us can forget that

"Une immense espérance a traversée la terre:
Malgré nous vers le ciel il fout tourner les yeux"

(quoted on page 264).

In dealing with India, stress is laid on the remarkable change in temper and thought revealed in the Indian Bible. First, the Aryan hymns showing "an exuberant enjoyment of the whole of Nature, a fearless appropriation of all its good things" (p. 62), and then the emergence of profound asceticism, indiscriminating Pantheism. No full explanation is given for this change; perhaps, without more knowledge than is attainable, none could be. The dominance of caste is explained as due to an inevitable reaction from the creed that tried to crush out distinctions. This is striking, but not quite convincing. An outsider might venture to suggest that, on the contrary, caste must have been in a direct line the natural result of crushing out individuality. More convincing is the statement that, whatever the horrors of the system, it did obtain its hold on men's hearts by enshrining one great idea, the idea of vocation.

In contrast to the indistinguishable unity adored and submitted to by India, we have the Persian conception of a sharp distinction between right and wrong; a distinction going so deep into the nature of things that the conflict between good and evil is not only world-wide, it is actually the cause of the world. The earth is a bastion against the powers of darkness, and this idea, Miss Wedgwood suggests (and the suggestion is pregnant), fascinated the vast imagination of Milton. Alike in "Paradise Lost" and in the Persian mythology, "it is the antagonism of a supernatural

being which starts the course of terrestrial history; the creation is its result" (p. 144).

Opposed to Persia again is the spirit of Greece, essentially the artist-people, for whom "in the rich garden of humanity there were many fruits, and of none was it said, 'Thou mayst not eat of the tree which bears it.' All experience was fruit—all was seed. To the Greek spirit none was poison" (p. 174). This is admirably put, and admirable, too, is the account of the paternal despotism of Rome, preparing the way, among other things, for the tyranny of the Holy Father.

We pass to the emergence of the burden of evil and suffering in men's minds, when, the city broken and the nation not yet born, the individual was flung back upon his own soul, when Epictetus preached the omnipotence and not merely the strength of will; when Marcus Aurelius clung to the spirit within himself that was more than himself, "the immortal and inseparable comrade," a conception that held "a promise of immortality" which he himself could not see (p. 317).

But the attempted solutions of the Stoics in all their forms (one may include Philo and Plutarch among the Stoics) could not satisfy Christians who had to face the failures of official Christianity and the shocks to the falling empire. Thus the Persian idea of something inherently evil in the world returned with great force, and with it the conception of man's work as essentially one that is to redeem the time. Redeem it from what? This is still the vital question for us, and Augustine's answer, though it cannot be ours, appears, as stated in this book, of singular interest. From bondage to the flesh, that is the answer; and this means that the pleasures of the flesh are to have no part whatever among the desirable *desiderata* of man. Augustine's position is distinguished, intellectually, from the Manichæan by the refusal to allow that matter in itself can be evil; only choice can be evil; but it is inspired by the Manichæan distrust of matter. "It is not any bodily condition which in itself is evil, he [Augustine] writes, but the fact that the bodily condition should dominate the will" (p. 431). Hence, his rooted distrust of marriage, on which, although he admits it as necessary, he has flung "the blight of the second-best."

This is set in effective contrast with the Northern (or modern) view of life, when "the love of woman changes from the centre of human temptation to the centre of human interest;" and "human

passion appears in connection with whatever is stately, whatever is vigorous, whatever is pure" (p. 453).

The book closes with an inspiring working out of the antithesis between the *ought* and the *is*.

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AN INQUIRY INTO SOCIALISM. By Thomas Kirkup. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Pp. vi, 216.

THE LIBERAL STATE: A SPECULATION. By Thomas Whittaker. London: Watts & Co., 1907. Pp. ix, 202.

Mr. Kirkup's inquiry into socialism is, or should be, too well known to need special or detailed notice. Nothing could be more opportune than the reissue in a substantially unaltered form of this eminently catholic as well as eminently reasonable statement of the socialist case. Socialism is not, in Mr. Kirkup's view, a stereotyped system of dogma, but a regulative idea of industrial organization, depending for its realization on "the irresistible momentum of two great revolutions—the industrial revolution and the political revolution named the new democracy." The aim of socialism is nothing less than to "render the mechanism of the industrial revolution really subservient to human welfare, and to realize a social and economic freedom suited to the political freedom proclaimed in the modern democracy. . . . Like the democracy, socialism aims at the realization of freedom for the mass of mankind." Certainly there is no inquiry into socialism that is better calculated to fulfil the aim the author has set himself—"to bring out what is fundamental in socialism, both as contrasted with the prevailing social system and with theories for which it is usually mistaken."

Among these theories, Mr. Kirkup has anticipated in advance what seems to be a fixed idea in Mr. Whittaker's conception of socialism. By the "Liberal State" is meant a State that "accepts democracy (not necessarily untempered) and intellectual freedom, not as mere temporary phases of a transition, but as permanent elements of an ideal polity. . . . The real opposition to the Liberal State is to be found in a hierarchical or bureaucratic State in which a caste or an order of experts as the representatives of a doctrine govern without systematic control." The